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Protection of Persons (Natural and Juridical)
Lung-chu Chent
The publication of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States1 in 1987 is an important event, for international
law has undergone substantial and significant change since the appear-
ance in 1965 of its predecessor, the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States.2 The new Restatement is a compre-
hensive revision of the original Restatement, both in its expanded scope
and its treatment, and it reflects important developments in international
law since the original Restatement. It seeks to come to grips with the
transformations wrought by the changing demands and expectations of
the peoples of the world, interacting under the ever-changing conditions
of growing interdependence and universal participation, as punctuated
by the shifting patterns of alignments and the universalizing trends of
science-based technology.
The new Restatement has condensed certain areas treated at length by
the previous Restatement (for example, recognition and state responsibil-
ity for injury to aliens), and has dealt with subject matters not covered or
just touched upon in the previous Restatement.3 One of the most notable
and welcome additions to the new Restatement is the growing field of
international human rights law, treated in Part VII, which is the focus of
the present review.
After an overview of Part VII, this review will examine the following:
(1) the conjunction of the international law of human rights and the cus-
tomary law of state responsibility for injury to aliens; (2) the customary
international law of human rights; (3) the standard of compensation for
expropriation of alien property; (4) the rights of aliens; and (5) the reme-
dies for violations of human rights obligations.
t Professor of Law, New York Law School; Research Affiliate in Law, Yale Law School.
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. Even though this volume belonged to the sec-
ond series of American Law Institute restatements, it was the original restatement on foreign
relations law of the United States.
3. These subjects are the law of the environment, the law of human rights, and selected
areas of international economic law.
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I. Overview of Part VII
Part VII of the new Restatement, dealing with "Protection of Persons
(Natural and Juridical)," contains three chapters and eight sections.
They are:
Chapter One. International Law of Human Rights
§ 701. Obligation to Respect Human Rights
§ 702. Customary International Law of Human Rights
§ 703. Remedies for Violation of Human Rights Obligations
Chapter Two. Injury to Nationals of Other States
§ 711. State Responsibility for Injury to Nationals of Other States
§ 712. State Responsibility for Economic Injury to Nationals of Other
States
§ 713. Remedies for Injury to Nationals of Other States
Chapter Three. Individual Rights in Foreign Relations: Law of the
United States
§ 721. Applicability of Constitutional Safeguards
§ 722. Rights of Aliens
Chapter One expresses the important developments of international
human rights law since the original Restatement, describing the obliga-
tions of a state under customary international law and international
agreements to respect the human rights of nationals and non-nationals
subject to its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the scope of human rights is
broadly defined as including "freedoms, immunities, and benefits which,
according to widely accepted contemporary values, every human being
should enjoy in the society in which he or she lives."' 4 This broad con-
ception of human rights is fitting and useful, in keeping with the dynamic
nature of human rights claims and decisions in the contemporary world.
Chapter Two deals with the obligations of a state toward nationals of
other states under customary international law. The concern is twofold:
respect for the human rights of individuals of foreign nationality, and
respect for the property interests of persons (juridical as well as natural)
of foreign nationality. This chapter represents a substantial condensation
and reorganization of the original Restatement's lengthy treatment of
state responsibility for injury to aliens, but it is not a significant departure
in substance.
Chapter Three sets forth certain principles of U.S. constitutional law
protecting individual rights that have special bearing on U.S. foreign re-
lations, including the rights of aliens.
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 701 comment a.
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Both Chapters One and Three are additions, and chapter two is a con-
densed version of the discussion in the previous Restatement. By group-
ing these materials in the context of the "protection of persons (natural
and juridical)," the Restatement reflects the growing impact of contem-
porary human rights law on the treatment of aliens, and gives impetus to
the efforts toward synthesizing the contemporary international law of
human rights and the customary law of state responsibility for injury to
aliens. This fusion approach was taken despite objections that fusing the
developing human rights law concerned with natural persons with the
well-established norms of state responsibility for injuries to aliens, appli-
cable to juridical as well as natural persons, is likely to undercut the
customary norms for the protection of aliens, especially in connection
with the issue of expropriation. 5 The next section examines the basis for
this fusion, explaining that customary international human rights law al-
ready binds states in their treatment of aliens.
II. The Conjunction of the International Law of Human Rights and
the Customary Law of State Responsibility for Injury to
Aliens
The overriding organizing principle of Part VII of the new Restate-
ment is the conjunction of the international law of human rights and the
customary law concerning responsibility of states for injury to aliens.
This structure, building on others' previous efforts toward synthesis, 6 sets
the tone and direction for the treatment of "Protection of Persons" in the
new Restatement and projects a reforming outlook. It is a giant step
forward.
The contemporary international law of human rights and the custom-
ary law of responsibility of states for injury to aliens, though often re-
garded as distinct in origin, historical development and jurisprudential
underpinnings, have shown remarkable affinity and strength for conver-
gence. As discussed below, they converge while retaining independent
vitality and thus reinforcing each other.
5. See, e.g., Carbonneau, The Convergence of the Law of State Responsibility for Injury to
Aliens and International Human Rights Norms in the Revised Restatement, 25 VA. J. INT'L L.
99 (1984).
6. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER ch. 14 (1980) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC OR-
DER]; see also R. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 41-61 (1984); Lillich, The Current Status of the Law of State Responsibility for
Injuries to Aliens, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO
ALIENS 1, 16-29 (R. Lillich ed. 1983); Lillich, The Problem of the Applicability of Existing
International Provisions for the Protection of Human Rights to Individuals Who Are Not Citi-
zens of the Country in Which They Live, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 507 (1976).
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Customary international law for the protection of aliens is well devel-
oped. When the nation-state was regarded as the only subject of interna-
tional law and the question of human rights was considered a matter of
domestic jurisdiction, customary law developed to protect aliens who still
owed allegiance to the state of their nationality despite their physical
1resence in the host country. Aliens in the host country are "nationals
abroad" from the perspective of the state of their nationality; they pro-
vide an important power base for a nation-state. Hence, any deprivation
imposed on nationals abroad is regarded as an offense against the state of
nationality, and the remedy for the deprivation runs to the state, though
the injured person is generally required to exhaust domestic remedies
before turning to the state of nationality for protection.7
Within the broad, historic development of this unique customary law
for the protection of aliens, two different standards of state responsibil-
ity-"national treatment" and a "minimum international standard"-
have vied for general community acceptance. The first principle main-
tains that aliens should receive equal, and only equal, treatment with
nationals, and the latter insist that, however a state may treat its nation-
als, there are certain minima required for the humane treatment of
aliens. A review of the flow of decisions and communications in the de-
velopment of the customary law about aliens, and especially in the re-
cent, more general human rights prescriptions, appears to sustain the
position that the minimum international standard, protecting all human
beings where they reside, has become present general community
expectation. 8
The contemporary global human rights movement-heir to other
great historic movements for human dignity, freedom and equality-has
largely developed since the creation of the United Nations. It expresses
the enduring elements in most of the world's great religions and philoso-
phies and builds on the findings of modern science about the interdepen-
dence between respect for human dignity and all other values.
The lessons of World War II, and in particular the atrocities of the
Third Reich, painfully taught the world that large-scale deprivations of
human rights not only decimate individuals and groups but also endan-
ger the general peace and security. Hence the U.N. Charter underscored
the close link between human rights and peace and security, the intimate
interplay between minimum world order (i.e., minimizing unauthorized
coercion) and optimum world order (i.e., the widest possible shaping and
7. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 866-78.
8. See id. at 749-58.
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sharing of all values). The promotion and protection of human rights
was made a prime objective of the United Nations, along with the main-
tenance of peace and security and the promotion of self-determination. 9
The peoples of the world, whatever their differences in cultural tradi-
tions and institutional practices, today demand most intensely all those
basic rights conveniently summarized in terms of the greater production
and wider sharing of the values of human dignity. These demands have
received authoritative expression not only in the U.N. Charter, but also
in a host of other human rights prescriptions, from the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights' o to the two International Covenants on Human
Rights," and numerous ancillary instruments, both global and regional.
The Universal Declaration, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and its Optional Protocol, 12 and the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights constitute what is com-
monly known as the International Bill of Human Rights.' 3 More than
the familiar form, this developing International Bill of Human Rights
has been greatly fortified in substance by various ancillary instruments
dealing with particular categories of persons (e.g., women, refugees,
stateless persons, aliens, the elderly, youths, children, disabled persons),
or particular values or subjects (e.g., genocide, apartheid, discrimination,
slavery, forced labor, torture, nationality, political participation, employ-
ment, education, marriage), by decisions and recommendations of inter-
national governmental organizations (especially by U.N. organs and
entities), and by customary developments in the transnational arena.' 4
The general human rights prescriptions of the U.N. Charter-notably
articles 1(3), 13(1), 55 and 56-were given somewhat more detailed spec-
ification in the Universal Declaration. The Universal Declaration has
9. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
10. Adopted Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Uni-
versal Declaration].
11. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. As of Dec. 31, 1987, 87 states were
parties to this covenant.); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. As of Dec.
31, 1987, 91 states were parties to this covenant.).
12. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. As of Dec.
31, 1987, 40 states were parties to this treaty.).
13. UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT SHEET No. 2, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1988).
14. For a convenient compilation of these documents, see UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS,
U.N. Doc. ST/HR/l/Rev.3, U.N. Sales No. E.88.XIV.1 (1988). For elaboration of a global
bill of human rights in the dynamic and comprehensive sense, see HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 313-63.
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acquired the attributes of authority in two ways. First, it is widely ac-
cepted as an authoritative specification of the content of the human
rights provisions of the U.N. Charter. Second, its frequent invocation
and application by officials, at all levels of government and in many com-
munities around the world, have conferred on it those expectations char-
acteristic of customary international law. 15
The two Covenants and the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights naturally are binding for all states that have
ratified or acceded to them. In addition, like the Universal Declaration,
they constitute not only authoritative interpretations of the Charter pro-
visions on human rights, but are also vital components in the flow of
communication that creates the expectations comprising customary in-
ternational law. By further specifying the content of internationally pro-
tected human rights and providing structures-and procedures (albeit with
inadequacies) to remedy deprivations, they help stabilize authoritative
expectations about the defense and fulfillment of human rights. In the
same vein, a growing body of more particular conventions dealing with
certain types of deprivees or deprivations has also-fostered the enrich-
ment and growth of the core content of the human rights prescriptions
projected in the U.N. Charter.
Together, these important human rights instruments cover, in popular
parlance, not only civil and political rights, but also economic, social and
cultural rights. They extend to all basic values widely cherished: re-
spect, power, enlightenment, well-being, wealth, skill, affection, and
rectitude. 16
15. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 273-74, 325-30,
and references cited therein; cf. UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BULLETIN
OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SPECIAL ISSUE, FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLA-
RATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1988) [hereinafter BULLETIN OF HUMAN RIGHTS]. In his intro-
duction to this special issue, Jan Martenson, Director-General of the U.N. Office at Geneva
and Under-Secretary-General for Human Rights, opened with the following paragraph:
Nineteen eighty-eight marks the 40th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The Declaration is nothing less than a monument to humankind, a veri-
table Magna Carta enumerating specific standards of achievement in the civil, political,
economic, social, and cultural fields that had never been attempted before and which are
valid for all members of the human family. In the years that have elapsed since the adop-
tion of that bold and inspiring document, the international community has made great
strides in translating the vision of the Declaration into global reality. Indeed, over fifty
international instruments dealing with basically all aspects of human endeavour have been
concluded since and have provided legal obligations to the primarily moral character of
the Universal Declaration. Within this wide-ranging international code of human rights,
the International Covenants on Human Rights take pride of place.
BULLETIN OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 1.
16. Values are preferred events-that which people cherish. The eight basic values are the
following:
Respect: freedom of choice, equality, and recognition;
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The authoritativeness of the Charter provisions on human rights, and
the specification of these rights in the Universal Declaration and related
instruments, have received tremendous fortification in the practice of in-
ternational governmental organizations, especially the organs of the
United Nations, and by regional efforts. 17
Another important body of practice contributing to the establishment
and maintenance of a global bill of rights is the customary international
law of the responsibility of states concerning the treatment of aliens. In
fact, the customary international law of state responsibility, in constant
interaction with and as an integral part of the contemporary human
rights movement, has contributed mightily to the sum total of the human
rights protection, helping to lift the level of transnational protection of
nationals and of aliens.
The upshot of this comprehensive and continuing prescription, rang-
ing in modality from the most deliberate to the least deliberate, would
appear to be that the core content of the various communications has
been prescribed as a global bill of human rights. This bill is, in both form
and policy content, much like those bills of rights created and maintained
in some national communities.'i Its core content expresses the intensely
demanded values of human rights around the world. Some call it a
global bill of human rights, some talk in terms ofjus cogens, some speak
of customary law.19 The point is that there are crystallized expectations
for the defense and fulfillment of human rights that are widely shared
and articulated, even though the degree of protection and fulfillment dif-
fers from community to community.
Central to this developing corpus of international human rights law is
the notion that every person is entitled to dignity simply because he or
she is a human being. This body of law reflects the clear and universal
recognition that the individual is the ultimate actor-the ultimate benefi-
Power: making and influencing community decisions;
Enlightenment: gathering, processing, and disseminating information and knowledge;
Well-being: safety, health, and comfort;
Wealth: production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services, control of
resources;
Skill: acquisition and exercise of capabilities in vocations, professions, and the arts;
Affection: intimacy, friendship, loyalty, positive sentiments;
Rectitude: participation in forming and applying norms of responsible conduct.
See HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 7-13. The aggregate of all
these values may be described as security. For further elaboration of these values in the con-
text of human rights, see id. at 7-37, 84-86. See also L. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CON-
TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 209-11 (1989).
17. See UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS
13-15, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/2/Rev.2, U.N. Sales No. E.83.XIV.2 (1983).
18. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 313-20.
19. See Id. at 317-19.
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ciary or the ultimate victim-in all social interaction and decisionmak-
ing, national or transnational. Hence, all the major human rights
instruments of general scope (most notably the Universal Declaration
and the two Covenants) are designed to apply to all human beings, irre-
spective of nationality.
The standard formula employed by the Universal Declaration is:
"Everyone has the right to. .... -20 Negatively, the formula is: "No one
shall be . . .,21 "Everyone" refers to all human beings, regardless of
nationality. In article 21, however, the Universal Declaration reserves
two rights exclusively to nationals:
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives. '
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his
country.22
These provisions reflect the long-shared.community expectation that dif-
ferentiation on the basis of alienage is permissible in regard to participa-
tion in the making of local community decisions, namely, voting and
holding office. The concern in the Universal Declaration that human
rights be protected, regardless of nationality, is further manifested in the
latter half of article 2: "Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the
basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country
or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust,
non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
'23
This concern for the protection of all human beings, based on the same
prescriptive formulas, is evident in both International Covenants on
Human Rights. Even human rights conventions with a more restrictive
focus are formulated generally in terms of every individual human being.
Similarly, two of the regional human rights conventions-European
and American-are cast in broad language designed to protect all human
beings, regardless of nationality, with exceptions clearly stipulated.
24
20. See Universal Declaration, supra note 10, arts. 3, 6, 8, 13, 14, 15(1), 17(1), 18," 19,
20(1), 22, 23, 24, 25(1), 26(1), 27.
21. Id. arts. 4, 5, 9, 11(2), 15(2), 17(2).
22. Id. arts. 21(1), 21(2); see also art. 13(2) ("Everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country.").
23. Id. art. 2.
24. See [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, adopted Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953. As of
Dec. 31, 1987, 21 states were parties to this convention.); American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23 doc.
rev.2 (entered into force July 18, 1978. As of Mar. 1, 1988, 20 states were parties to this
convention.).
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The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights also employs the
phrase "every individual. '25
In short, the principal thrust of the contemporary human rights move-
ment is to accord nationals the same protection formerly accorded only
to aliens while at the same time raising the standard of protection for all
human beings, nationals as well as aliens, far beyond the minimum inter-
national standard developed under earlier customary law. When the new
human rights prescriptions are considered in their totality, they extend to
all the basic human dignity values the peoples of the world today de-
mand, and the more detailed standards specified with regard to each of
these values exhibit all the precision that rational application either per-
mits or requires. This makes the continuing debate about the doctrines
of the minimum international standard and of national treatment highly
artificial, because an international standard is now authoritatively pre-
scribed for all human beings. 26 However, it does not follow, as elabo-
rated below, that these new developments in substantive prescription
about human rights have rendered obsolete the protection of individuals
through the traditional procedures developed by the customary law of
the responsibility of states for injuries to aliens. 27
III. The Customary International Law of Human Rights
Against the background of the developing global bill of human rights,
the new Restatement's treatment of the customary international law of
human rights takes on special significance, especially in view of the fact
that the United States has ratified very few human rights treaties. 28 Sec-
tion 702 of the Restatement reads:
25. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June, 1981, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21,
1986. As of April 16, 1987, 33 states were parties to the Charter.). Unlike the other two
regional human rights conventions, the African Charter enunciates "peoples' rights" in addi-
tion to "individual rights."
26. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 74973; see also F.
GARCIA-AMADOR, L. SOHN & R. BAXTER, RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 1-7 (1974).
27. See infra Part VI.
28. "The customary law of human rights," it may be noted, "is part of the law of the
United States to be applied as such by state as well as federal courts." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 70 2 comment c. Of approximately two dozen human rights treaties concluded
under the auspices of the United Nations, the United States has ratified only the following: (1)
Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, done Dec. 7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479, T.I.A.S. No.
3532, 182 U.N.T.S. 51 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1953, ratified by the United States Mar. 7,
1956); (2) Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institu-
tions and Practices Similar to Slavery, done Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S. No. 6418,
266 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Apr. 30, 1957, ratified by the United States Dec, 6, 1967);
(3) Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S.
550
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A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it prac-
tices, encourages, or condones
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman,, or degrading treatment or
punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights.2
9
At first glance, this black-letter formula gives the impression of being
rather conservative and restrictive. The accompanying comment, how-
ever, quickly dispels such an impression. According to comment a, the
short list is designed to reflect "only those human rights whose status as
customary law is generally accepted (as of 1987) and whose scope and
content are generally agreed."' 30 Moreover, the list, short and incomplete
as it may be, is open-ended. In the words of the Restatement, "[t]his list
is not necessarily complete, and is not closed: human rights not listed in
this section may have achieved the status of customary law, and some
rights might achieve that status in the future."'3 ' The Restatement fur-
ther emphasizes that the violations of human rights cited in this section
constitute "violations of customary international law only if practiced,
encouraged, or condoned by the government of a state as official
policy."'3 2
No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967, ratified by the United States Oct.
4, 1968); (4) Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature Mar. 31,
1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force July 7, 1954,
ratified by the United States July 7, 1976); and (5) Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan.
12, 1951, ratified by the United States Nov. 4, 1988).
The executive branch has signed and submitted the following treaties to the Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification, but the Senate has not yet acted on them: (1) International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, supra note 11; (2) International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force
Jan. 4, 1969, submitted by President Carter to the Senate on Feb. 23, 1978); (3) Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1979) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981, submitted by President Carter
to the Senate on Nov. 12, 1980); and (4) Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/
46 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987, submitted by President Reagan to the Senate on
May 23, 1988).
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 702.
30. Id. § 702 comment a.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 702 comment b.
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The reporters were understandably cautious in formulating an innova-
tive clause such as this; they settled for a short list selected from the
rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, despite
an ever growing shared expectation that the Universal Declaration, in its
entirety, has become customary international law or simply reflects an
authoritative interpretation of the human rights obligations of the U.N.
Charter.33 This reviewer would prefer to see a clear statement that af-
firms the customary law character of the Universal Declaration and,
hence, expands the list of customary human rights under contemporary
international law. The Restatement seems to toy with the idea but is less
than straightforward. 34
Moreover, this reviewer would prefer to see the necessary and explicit
statement about the open-ended nature of the customary law list be made
part of the black-letter formula. As it is, item (g), "a consistent pattern
of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights," cannot
effectively serve such an open-ended function. Item (g), as the Restate-
ment makes clear, differs in character from items (a) to (f):
The acts enumerated in clauses (a) to (f) are violations of customary law
even if the practice is not consistent, or not part of a "pattern," and those
acts are inherently "gross" violations of human rights. Clause (g) includes
other infringements of recognized human rights that are not violations of
customary law when committed singly or sporadically .... [T]hey become
violations of customary law if the state is guilty of a "consistent pattern of
gross violations" as state policy. A violation is gross if it is particularly
shocking because of the importance of the right or the gravity of the
violation.
35
Even operating under the cautious posture taken by the Restatement,
it would appear that, at a minimum, systematic discrimination based on
sex, religion, and language deserves a place now along with "systematic
racial discrimination." After all, the general norm of non-discrimination
on grounds of race, sex, language, or religion has been clearly enunciated
again and again in the U.N. Charter and a whole host of human rights
instruments, and has served as a keystone of the contemporary interna-
tional human rights law.36 A major stated purpose of the U.N. Charter,
reinforced by more detailed provisions, is to "achieve international coop-
eration.., in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
33. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 702 reporters' note 1.
35. Id. § 702 comment m.
36. For elaboration, see HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at
561-68. See generally id. at 561-796.
552
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for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-
guage, or religion."'37
In its comment on customary law of human rights andjus cogens, the
Restatement further points out that "[n]ot all human rights norms are
peremptory norms (fus cogens), but those in clauses (a).to (f) of this sec-
tion are, and an international agreement that violates them is void."'38
Such clarification makes it clear that candidates for future inclusion in
the list of customary international human rights need not rise to the level
ofjus cogens. Ajus cogens, a "peremptory norm of general international
law," as defined in article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, is "a norm accepted and recognized by the international com-
munity of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is per-
mitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character. '39 "A treaty is void if, at
the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law" 4 and, furthermore, "[i]f a new peremptory norm of
general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict
with that norm becomes void and terminates." 41
Though the obligations of the customary law of human rights are not
necessarily jus cogens, they are erga omnes-obligations to all states.42
Hence, "a violation by a state of the rights of persons subject to its juris-
diction is a breach of obligation to all other states."' 43 The legal signifi-
cance of this will be further developed in the next section, which
discusses remedies.
IV. The Standard of Compensation for Expropriation of Alien
Property
The standard of compensation for expropriation of alien property was
one of the most hotly debated topics in the drafting process. The key
provision is section 712, "State Responsibility for Economic Injury to
Nationals of Other States," which reads in part:
A state is responsible under international law for injury resulting from:
(1) a taking by the state of the property of a national of another state
that
37. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3).
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 702 comment n.
39. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, adopted May 22, 1969, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/29 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
40. 40. Id.
41. Id. art. 64.
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 702 comment o, § 701 comment c.
43. Id. § 701 reporters' note 3.
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(a) is not for a public purpose, or
(b) is discriminatory, or
(c) is not accompanied by provision for just compensation;
For compensation to be just under this subsection, it must, in the absence
of exceptional circumstances, be in an amount equivalent to the value of the
property taken and be paid at the time of taking, or within a reasonable
time thereafter with interest from the date of taking, and in a form econom-
ically usable by the foreign national. 44
While the new Restatement treats this subject in fewer sections and
allocates the message and material among black letter rules, comments,
and reporters' notes differently from the previous Restatement, it has
made no significant change in substance. 45 As formulated, this provision
represents a strong reaffirmation of the customary norm that permits a
state to expropriate alien property only when a taking is for a public
purpose, non-discriminatory, and is accompanied by just compensation.
Acknowledging that this traditional norm has been challenged in recent
years, the present Restatement reaffirms that the traditional rules, as em-
bodied in sections 187-190 of the original Restatement,46 "continue to be
valid and effective principles of international law."'47 "Just compensa-
tion," reflecting the formula of "prompt, adequate and effective compen-
sation" stressed by the United States, 48 is given further specification, so
that disputes concerning the method of valuation of property can be
minimized.
Though the final formulation appears to be acceptable even to oppo-
nents of earlier drafts, it did not come about without considerable de-
bate.49 Earlier drafts, exemplified by section 712 in Tentative Draft No.
13, provoked intense controversy,50 stemming in large part from differ-
ing appraisals of the legal effect of certain key resolutions concerning
expropriation adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, especially those
which emanated from the drive to establish a new international economic
order.5'
44. Id. § 712.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 184-196.
46. Id. §§ 187-190.
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 712 comment b.
48. Id. § 712 comment c, reporters' note 2. The classic position on "prompt, adequate and
effective" compensation was first made by Secretary of State Cordell Hull. See 3 G. HACK-
WORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 655-60 (1942).
49. See, e.g., Clagett & Poneman, Treatment of Economic Injury to Aliens in the Revised
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 INT'L LAW. 35 (1988).
50. See, e.g., Clagett, Protection of Foreign Investment Under the Revised Restatement,
25 VA. J. INT'L L. 73 (1984); Robinson, Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 176 (1984).
51. See infra notes 54-76 and accompanying text.
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The subject of expropriation, as Justice John Harlan noted in the Sab-
batino case, has been one of the most controversial areas in contempo-
rary international law. 52 Beginning with the nationalization measures
taken by the Soviet and Mexican revolutionary governments following
World War I, differences of opinion developed over what constitutes a
lawful taking under international law. The debate has intensified with
the rapid multiplication of newly independent states after World War II.
Although the "public purpose" and "nondiscrimination" criteria are
generally accepted, controversy rages over the issue of compensation.
Most Communist states, in theory at least, contend that no compensa-
tion is required. Such a position accords with the general Soviet rejection
of the binding nature of customary international law. In practice, how-
ever, Communist states have not generally acted on this theory, no doubt
for practical reasons. Since World War II, more than seventy agree-
ments signed by Communist states have included a compensation
requirement.
Capital-exporting states generally follow the customary law mentioned
above and insist that a taking of property be accompanied by compensa-
tion. They may differ, however, on what precisely the standard of com-
pensation entails-"prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation or
simply "just," "full," or "appropriate" compensation.5 3
Conversely, capital-importing states increasingly assert that whether
and how much, if any, compensation is granted depends on the circum-
stances. The backbone of this contention is the assertion that all states
exercise "permanent sovereignty" over their natural resources. The rele-
vant factors are said to include the entire historical relations between the
foreign enterprise and the host state; the ability of the taking state to pay
compensation; the degree of unjust enrichment, if any, on the part of the
taking state; the extent of prior exploitation by the foreign enterprise; and
52. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-29 (1963). For controversies
concerning expropriation under international law, see generally 1-4 THE VALUATION OF NA-
TIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Lillich ed. 1972, 1973, 1975 & 1987);
G. WHITE, NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY (1961); M. SORNARAJAH, THE PUR-
SUIT OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY (1986); Brower & Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of International Law?, 9 INT'L LAW. 295
(1975); Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property, 75 AM. J.
INT'L L. 553 (1981); Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in
International Law, 176 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURs 259 (1982); Weston, The New Interna-
tional Economic Order and the Deprivation of Foreign Proprietary Wealth: Some Reflections
upon the Contemporary International Law Debate, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RE-
SPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 89 (R. Lillich ed. 1983); Jimenez de Arechaga, State
Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign Owned Property, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
179 (1978); Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 121 (1984).
53. Cf. Clagett & Poneman, supra note 48, at 45-46.
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the extent of undue advantage enjoyed by the foreign property owner
before expropriation.54 In support of their position, the capital-import-
ing states rely especially on the resolutions adopted in 1974 by the Gen-
eral Assembly as a drive toward a New International Economic Order:
the Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order (Resolution 3201) and the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States (Resolution 3281).5
More specifically, the debate centers on the relative authority of para-
graph 4 of Resolution 1803, on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Re-
sources (1962), vis-a-vis article 2(2)(c) of Resolution 3281, the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States (1974), and paragraph 3 of Reso-
lution 3171. Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1803 declares:
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds
or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are rec-
ognized as overriding purely individual or private interest, both domestic
and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensa-
tion, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures
in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law.
In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy,
the national jurisdiction of the State taking such measures shall be ex-
hausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other parties
concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration or
international adjudication.5 6
In contrast, article 2(2)(c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Du-
ties of States (Resolution 3281) declares that each state has the right to
nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which
case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such
measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all cir-
cumstances that the State considers pertinent, In any case where the ques-
tion of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the
domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is
freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful
means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in
accordance with the principle of free choice of means. 5 7
Paragraph 3 of Resolution 3171, similar to article 2(2)(c), states that
the application of the principle of nationalization carried out by States, as
an expression of their sovereignty in order to safeguard their natural re-
sources, implies that each State is entitled to determine the amount of possi-
54. Cf. Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 51.
55. G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6 Spec. Sess. Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974); G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
56. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doe. A/5217 (1962).
57. G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 54.
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ble compensation and the mode of payment, and that any disputes which
might arise should be settled in accordance with the national legislation of
each State carrying out such measure. 58
In sum, Resolution 1803 emphasizes the payment of "appropriate
compensation" in accordance with "international law" and settlement of
the dispute "through arbitration or international adjudication," while
Resolutions 3281 and 3171 leave it to the expropriating state to deter-
mine appropriate compensation and to settle any dispute according to its
domestic law and tribunals. Thus, the latter represent an attempt to re-
move the matter of compensation for expropriated property entirely out
of the realm of international law and to place it within the domain of
national law.
Obviously, the two positions are incompatible. Which one, then, is
authoritative?
This issue was highlighted in the arbitral award of Texaco Overseas
Petroleum v. Libyan Arab Republic,59 which involved claims against
Libya for its nationalization of all of the rights, interests, and property of
two international oil companies in Libya. The two oil companies relied
heavily on Resolution 1803, but Libya strongly invoked, among others,
Resolution 3171 and article 2(2)(c) of Resolution 3281. Though Libya
refused to take part in the arbitral proceedings, it set forth its position in
a memorandum to the president of the court. The sole arbitrator, Rene-
Jean Dupuy (appointed by the president of the International Court of
Justice), rejected Libya's claim that "any dispute relating to nationaliza-
tion or its consequences should be decided in conformity with the provi-
sions of the municipal law of the nationalizing State and only in its
courts,"' 60 and delivered an award on the merits in favor of the
companies.
Dupuy discussed the legal effect of U.N. General Assembly resolutions
in general and that of the above-mentioned resolutions in particular. He
noted that the "legal value" of U.N. resolutions "differs considerably,
depending on the type of resolution and the conditions attached to its
adoption and its provisions. '61 Hence, in "appraising the legal validity
of the above-mentioned Resolutions," he resorted to "the criteria usually
58. G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
59. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company v. Libyan
Arab Republic (Award on the Merits, Jan. 19, 1977), trans. into English and reprinted in 17
I.L.M. 1 (1978).
60. Id. at 31, para. 90.
61: Id. at 29, para. 86.
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taken into consideration, i.e., the examination of voting conditions and
the analysis of the provisions concerned. '62
Noting that Resolution 1803 was "passed by the General Assembly by
87 votes to 2, with 12 abstentions," he stressed that the majority voting
for this text included "many States of the Third World" and "several
Western developed countries with market economies, including the most
important one, the United States."' 63 He pointed out, however, that the
conditions under which Resolutions 3171 and 3281 were adopted were
"notably different." The "specific paragraph concerning nationalization,
disregarding the role of international law," as contained in Resolution
3171, "not only was not consented to by the most important Western
countries, but caused a number of the developing countries to abstain." 64
Similarly, "paragraph 2(c) of article 2 of the Charter, which limits con-
sideration of the characteristics of compensation to the State and does
not refer to international law, was voted by 104 to 16, with 6 abstentions,
all of the industrialized countries with market economies having ab-
stained or having voted against it."'65
Thus, "only Resolution 1803" was "supported by a majority of Mem-
ber States representing all of the various groups."'66 In contrast, the
other resolutions were "supported by a majority of States but not by any
of the developed countries with market economies which carry on the
largest part of international trade."' 67 "On the basis of the circumstances
of adoption mentioned above and by expressing an opinio juris com-
munis," he concluded that Resolution 1803 "seems to this Tribunal to
reflect the state of customary law existing in this field." '68 He further
stated that "[t]he absence of any connection between the procedure of
compensation and international law and the subjection of this procedure
solely to municipal law cannot be regarded by this Tribunal except as a
de legeferenda formulation, which even appears contra legem in the eyes
of many developed countries." 69 This position is "further reinforced by
an examination of the general practice of relations between States with
respect to investments." '70
62. Id. at 28, para. 83.
63. Id. at 28, para. 84.
64. Id. at 29, para. 85.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 30, para. 86.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 30, para. 87.
69. Id. at 30, para. 88.
70. Id. at 30, para. 89.
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Significantly, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal-with a highly
respected membership and an active docket-has also upheld the cus-
tomary standard of "full" compensation in a series of recent decisions.71
For example, in Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company and the
Islamic Republic of Iran,72 the Tribunal considered "what is the applica-
ble standard of compensation under customary international law."' 73 The
Tribunal first observed that" 'the overwhelming practice and the prevail-
ing legal opinion' before World War II supported the view that custom-
ary international law required compensation equivalent to the full value
of the property taken."' 74 "It is only since those days," the Tribunal ad-
ded, "that this traditional legal standpoint has been challenged by a
number of States and commentators. ' 75 What was the response of the
Tribunal to this challenge?
The Tribunal, as in the Texaco case discussed above, first affirmed the
validity of Resolution 1803 in these words: "There is considerable una-
nimity in international arbitral practice and scholarly opinion that of the
resolutions cited above, it is Resolution 1803, and not either of the two
later resolutions [General Assembly Resolutions 3201 and 3281], which
at least reflects, if it does not evidence, current international law."'76 It
concluded that
Opinions both of international tribunals [including this very Tribunal] and
of legal writers overwhelmingly support the conclusion that under custom-
ary international law in a case such as here presented-a discrete expropria-
tion of alien property-full compensation should be awarded for the
property taken. This is true whether or not the expropriation itself was
otherwise lawful.77
With the clear reaffirmation of the customary standard of just compen-
sation, the next question is what constitutes just compensation. For com-
pensation to be "just," section 712 further specifies, "it must, in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, be in an amount equivalent to the
value of the property taken and be paid at the time of taking, or within a
reasonable time thereafter with interest from the date of taking, and in a
form economically usable by the foreign national. '78 This method of val-
71. See Brower, Current Developments in the Law of Expropriation and Compensation: A
Preliminary Survey of Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 21 INT'L LAW. 639
(1987).
72. Award No. ITL 59-129-3 (Mar. 27, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 629 (1986).
73. Id. at 632.
74. Id. (footnote omitted).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 634.
77. Id. (footnote omitted).
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 712.
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uation of the property taken reflects, in general, what is traditionally
meant by "prompt, adequate, and effective," "full," or "just" compensa-
tion.79 What has caused some concern is the built-in exception of "ex-
ceptional circumstance."80 The Restatement does not define it but offers
two examples: (1) "takings of alien property during war or similar exi-
gency,"8 I and (2) "expropriation as part of a national program of agricul-
tural land reform."' 82 Obviously, an exceptional rule of this nature does
not lend itself to exact specification but requires application in a disci-
plined manner by reference to the totality of factors involved in a partic-
ular context. I believe such flexibility, would facilitate adequate
consideration of the legitimate aspirations and genuine grievances of the
taking state in the search for the common interest of all parties
concerned. 83
V. The Rights of Aliens
Chapter Three, dealing with individual rights in foreign relations
under the law of the United States, begins by setting forth in section 721
the applicability of constitutional safeguards:
The provisions of the United States Constitution safeguarding individual
rights generally control the United States government in the conduct of its
foreign relations as well as in domestic matters, and generally limit govern-
mental authority whether it is exercised in the United States or abroad, and
whether such authority is exercised unilaterally or by international
agreement.84
It is made abundantly clear that "[a]ny exercise of authority by the
United States in the conduct of foreign relations is subject to the Bill of
Rights and other constitutional restraints protecting individual rights." 85
The Restatement then shifts focus to the "Rights of Aliens," stating:
(1) An alien in the United States is entitled to the guarantees of the
United States Constitution other than those expressly reserved for citizens.
(2) Under Subsection (1), an alien in the United States may not be de-
nied the equal protection of the laws, but equal protection does not preclude
reasonable distinctions between aliens and citizens, or between different cat-
egories of aliens.86
79. Id. § 712 comment d; cf. supra note 48 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Clagett & Poneman, supra note 49, at 43-45.
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 712 comment d.
82. Id. § 712 reporters' note 3.
83. Cf. L. CHEN, supra note 16, at 301-15, 357-69 (discussing use of the economic instru-
ment and the prescribing function in international law).
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 721.
85. Id. § 721 comment a.
86. Id. § 722.
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Section 722- represents what a commentator called a "domestic ap-
proach," with an inordinate reliance on domestic judicial decisions. 87
A remarkable feature in the present Restatement, as previously stated,
is the conjunction of the international law of human rights and the cus-
tomary law of state responsibility regarding injury to aliens. 88 It would
have been immensely helpful if the Restatement had gone a step further
in clarifying in Chapter Three the rights of aliens in the United States not
only from a constitutional law perspective, but also from an international
law perspective, examining the interrelations between domestic and inter-
national law, including the degree of congruence and incongruence, the
gaps and the differences, and the task of integration.
In addition,' a special category of aliens, namely refugees, deserves
much greater attention, given the ever growing importance of refugee
problems for the world community in general and for the United States
in particular.89 Such a discussion would be appropriate since the Re-
statement is partly concerned with "domestic law that has substantial
significance for the foreign relations of the United States or has other
substantial international consequences." 90 Although the United States
has ratified the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees91 and
enacted the Refugee Act of 1980,92 the Restatement gives refugee
problems only a cursory treatment under section 711 rather than here.93
The Refugee Act contains two key principles: granting asylum to those
who have "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion" 94 and prohibiting the forcible return (deportation) of aliens
whose "life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
87. Nafziger, Restating the Rights of Aliens, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 125, 129-31 (1984).
88. See supra notes 6-27 and accompanying text.
89. On refugee problems see generally T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION:
PROCESS AND POLICY 615-743 (1985); A. DowTY, CLOSED BORDERS: THE CONTEMPORARY
ASSAULT ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (1987); G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (1983); A. LIEBOWITZ, IMMIGRATION LAW AND REFUGEE POLICY
(1983); A. GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM (1980); Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng. (1979); UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES, A MANDATE TO PROTECT AND AssIsT REFUGEES (1971).
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § l(b).
91. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 19.67, G.A. Res. 2198, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 48, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967, for the United States Nov. 1, 1968. As of Dec.
31, 1987, 101 states were parties to this treaty.).
92. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 711 reporters' note 7.
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).
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political opinion."'95 The growing importance of this field is illustrated
by the two recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court: INS v. Stevic96
and INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.97 Stevic applies the "clear probability"
standard to govern withholding of deportation proceedings, and Car-
doza-Fonseca applies the "well-founded fear" standard to govern asylum
proceedings. The latter, giving more consideration to subjective ele-
ments, is deemed more generous to the asylum seeker.98
VI. Remedies for Violations of Human Rights Obligations
A central concern in the field of human rights is to enable victims or
others to bring complaints to authoritative decisionmakers for remedy of
human rights deprivations. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. noted
long ago, a right without a remedy is not a real right. The reporters of
the new Restatement were properly sensitive to this dimension. Thus, it
is highly significant that the Restatement emphasizes that in principle the
special avenues for remedies supplement and reinforce, but do not re-
place, ordinary remedies available under international law.99 The Re-
statement considers the general principles of remedies for violations of
international law in Part IX I°° and remedies for particular violations of
international law dealing with injuries to private persons in sections 703
and 713. Section 703 discusses remedies for violations of human rights
obligations; section 713 considers remedies for injuries to aliens.
95. Id. § 1253(h)(1).
96. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
97. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
98. Id. at 428-31. The Cardoza-Fonseca Court stated:
In Stevic, we rejected an alien's contention that the § 208(a) "well-founded fear" stan-
dard governs applications for withholding of deportation under § 243(h). Similarly, today
we rejected the Government's contention that the § 243(h) standard, which requires an
alien to show that he is more likely than not to be subject to persecution, governs applica-
tions for asylum under § 208(a). Congress used different, broader language to define the
term "refugee" as used in § 208(a) than it used to describe the class of aliens who have a
right to withholding of deportation under § 243(h). The [Refugee] Act's establishment of
a broad class of refugees who are eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum, and a nar-
rower class of aliens who are given a statutory right not to be deported to the country
where they are in danger, mirrors the provisions of the United Nations Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, which provided the motivation for the enactment of the Refugee
Act of 1980. In addition, the legislative history of the 1980 Act makes it perfectly clear
that Congress did not intend the class of aliens who qualify as refugees to be coextensive
with the class who qualify for § 243(h) relief.
Id. at 423-24 (footnote omitted).
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 703 comment a.
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) Pt. IX, §§ 901-907.
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Under customary international law concerning state responsibility for
injury to aliens, the typical remedy is that of diplomatic protection.101
Since an injury to an alien, as popularized by Vattel, is perceived to be an
injury to the state of nationality, this remedy requires the nationality link
and permits the state of nationality to protect injured persons and to
espouse their claims against other states under the normal requirements
of exhaustion of local remedies. The protecting state, having interests
independent of those of the injured persons, enjoys discretion whether to
espouse claims on behalf of its nationals at the international level. Be-
cause of their overriding concern for national interests of all sorts (such
as minimizing friction with a friendly nation), state elites may give short
shrift to deprived persons, placing then largely at the mercy of state offi-
cials.' 02 Nevertheless, this important remedy has historically served the
function of protecting the interests not only of the state but also of pri-
vate persons, even in an era when the nation-state was often regarded as
"the exclusive and sole subject" of international law and international
tribunals and other transnational arenas of authority were generally
closed to claims by private persons.
Contemporary international human rights law, inspired by more cath-
olic conceptions of the subjects of international law, has added an impor-
tant dimension to the traditional state-centered claim system. With the
increasing recognition of the rights of private persons, various arrange-
ments and remedies are made available to protect these rights. Thus, in
addition to the state-to-state complaint system, individuals have gained,
for remedy of deprivations, either direct or derivative access to transna-
tional arenas of authority, both global and regional. Notable among
them are: the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights
Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
the Committee against Torture, the European Commission on Human
Rights, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 0 3 Yet
101. See generally E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD
OR THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS (1919); F. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATION-
ALS: A STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1932); HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 866-78; L. SOHN & R. BAXTER, CONVENTION ON
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1961); Harvard
Research in International Law, The Law of Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their
Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 23 (Supp.) AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1929).
102. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 6, at 867-68.
103. See id. at 192-98, 278-89, 774-76; see generally T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL (1988); GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-
TICE (H. Hannum ed. 1984); 1 & 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND
POLICY ISSUES (T. Meron ed. 1984); T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE
UNITED NATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF INSTRUMENTS AND PROCESS (1986); A. ROBERTSON,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD (2d ed. 1982); P. SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
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the prospect of further direct access by individuals to authoritative trans-
national arenas, though encouraging, remains far from adequate.
As long as states remain the most important and most effective partici-
pants in transnational processes of decision, espousal of claims by states
for deprivations suffered by private persons would appear indispensable
to full protection in the common interest. The traditional channels of
protection through a state, together with the newly developed procedures
under the contemporary human rights program of claims by individuals,
achieve a cumulative beneficent impact in the protection of private per-
sons. Remedy through claims by a protecting state and through individ-
ual petition need not be mutually exclusive; they can be made to
reinforce each other for the better defense of the human rights of the
individual. 104
Finally, it may be recalled that the obligations of customary interna-
tional law of human rights are, according to the authors of the Restate-
ment, obligations by each state to all other states-erga omnes. 10 5
Hence, they conclude that "any state may pursue remedies for their vio-
lation, even if the individual victims were not nationals of the com-
plaining state and the violation did not affect any other particular interest
of that state."'' 0 6
VII. Conclusion
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, in the area of protecting both natural and juridical persons,
promises to exert significant impact on those who are concerned with the
tasks of making, invoking, applying, or appraising international law, in-
cluding transnational and national decisionmakers, policy advisors, prac-
titioners, and scholars--dissenting voices notwithstanding. Its
contributions are reassuring, innovative, progressive, and enormous,
helping chart a path of great potential for the better protection and ful-
fillment of human rights. The reporters and the American Law Institute
deserve high marks and congratulations for a difficult task well done.
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